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Abstract
This paper consists of five related notes on Japanese health care.
Section 1 of the paper proposes a simple model of health care needs in a
stationary population where all the sickness is concentrated in the period leading up to
death.  The main variables determining the burden of health care, such as life
expectancy, duration of chronic illness prior to death, etc., are identified.  While we are
not able to comment (at this time), on trends in the prevalence of chronic conditions in
old age, extrapolation of trends in life expectancy presented in Section 2 of the paper
suggest that there will be continuing increase in the number of Japanese surviving to
extremely old ages.  This aging of the population will assuredly put upward pressure on
health spending, but this pressure must be put in the context of other factors.  Section 3
decomposes increase in Japanese health care spending into portions attributable to
overall demographic increase, change in population age structure, and change in a
residual “underlying factors” term subsuming changes in technology, health system
coverage, etc.  The residual dominates total increase in health care spending.  In fact,
based on historical data and projected demographic trends, the strongest upward
pressure from population aging occurred in the period 1980-95, when aging accounted
for 1.4 percentage points of 5.6% per annum total health expenditure growth.  Health
care spending growth attributed to ageing is estimated to be 1.13% per annum in 1995-
2020 and only 0.34% per annum in 2020-2050.
Section 4 focuses on home care of the elderly and suggests that there is a
substantial ongoing decline in the supply of potential in-family caregivers.  Lower
fertility is an important determinant of this trend.  Section 5 describes the overall profile
of the Japanese health care system, noting that it receives relatively high marks in
international comparisons but tends to lump together acute care and chronically ill
patients.  As recognized by the “Gold Plan” policy currently being implemented, there
is a severe shortage of nursing home facilities beds as well as services to make home
care a more practical option for families.  A simple ratio analysis suggests that the
number of bedridden chronically ill persons (i.e., the population that would ideally be
cared for in a nursing home setting) will reach 1,800,000 by 2020 as opposed to 600,000
today.
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1Japan’s Logevity Revolution and the Implications for Health
Care Finance and Long-term Care
Les Mayhew
Introduction
For some time there has been considerable academic interest in the remarkable
population aging process underway in Japan (Feeney, 1990; Ogawa and Matsukura,
1997; Takahasi et al., 1999; Horlacher, 2000). As older people require more health care,
a parallel literature has emerged about reforms to the Japanese health care system,
analyzing the basis for the various policy changes over the last 20-30 years (Steslicke,
1989; Ogawa, 1989; Ogawa, 1993; OECD, 1990; Kawai, 1996). IIASA’s work on
health care expenditure shows that it is around six times more expensive to treat older
than younger people (Mayhew, 2000) so that almost inevitably, as aging proceeds and
health care technology advances a significantly greater share of GDP will be absorbed
by health care activities. Japan is the most rapidly aging country in the world and so the
way it is approaching the aging issue, especially the nature of current reforms to its
health care system, is of wider interest.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the long-term impact of Japanese aging
on health care provision, especially long-term care. We start with a highly simplified
stationary population model which incorporates assumptions based on the observation
that much health care expenditure is incurred in the period prior to death (Fuchs, 1984;
Seale and Cartwright, 1994). The crucial question both for policy makers and
individuals is whether added years of life expectancy are healthy or unhealthy ones.
The importance of answering this question is made clear by the following section,
which uses historical data to extrapolate impressive increases in the number of Japanese
surviving to advanced ages. While the growing number of elderly will challenge the
health care system, it is also important to keep the impact of population aging in
perspective.  A model decomposing health care spending into components due to
demographic and non-demographic factors suggests that it is the latter that have
dominated in the past and will be even more important in the future.
We conclude that, to date, the Japanese health care system has coped with the
enormous changes exceptionally well and that policy responses have been both timely
and appropriate. However, we also find that Japanese society is not only aging rapidly
but also changing structurally at the level of the family. A decline in the number of
potential caregivers, due mostly to increasing elderly dependency ratios at the
household level, is bound to lead to pressure to expand long-term care. We conclude the
paper with a general discussion that compares Japan's health care system with that of
other countries, and find that it is well regarded from an external perspective.  However,
2as policy makers are aware, better policies are needed to cope with the bedridden
elderly.
Chronic illness in a stationary population
As a number of writers have pointed out, much health expenditure is incurred to
treat chronic illness and conditions in the period before death (Fuchs, 1984).  Consider
Figure 1, which shows the survival curve FBC for a hypothetical stationary population
(i.e., a population that has reached steady state).  The vertical axis shows the number of
survivors and the horizontal axis age. Imagine that the first instance of chronic illness
occurs at age x1 (point A on the survival curve), a years prior to the onset of mortality at
age x2 (point B), after which a constant number of deaths  b = BZ / CZ occur each year
up to a maximum age x4 (point C) after which nobody survives. Note that the period of
chronic illness prior to death a is assumed to be independent of age at death and that the
maximum age to which anyone survives free of chronic illness is x3  (point D).
The chronically ill population is given by the area of the parallelogram ABCD
while the healthy population is given by the area FADO. If x2 increases but x4 is
unchanged then the survival curve becomes more rectangular, a process sometimes
termed the compression of mortality (Fries, 1980).  If the duration of chronic illness a
remains the same, then the result is that chronic illness is compacted into older years.
Conversely, if x2 remains constant and x4 increases (the dispersion of mortality) while a
remains the same, then chronic illness is spread over a wider age range.  Later we will
test whether Japanese mortality is becoming more compacted or dispersed.
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Figure 1: Survival and chronic illness
3Table 1 provides selected theoretical relationships based on the simplified model
in Figure 1.  Table 1, line 1 tells us, for example, that the number of chronically ill
people is a constant depending on the population at x2 and the period of disability a.  In
a stationary population it means that the number of chronically ill people does not vary
from year to year unless the period of chronic illness and disability changes.  Another
way to look at it is to note that area ABCD always equals area ABZV, which is a
constant.
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Table 1: Some parameters of interest
4The cohort death rate and age specific mortality rate are given in Table 1, lines 2
and 3, whilst the proportion of population that is chronically ill is given in line 4.  The
latter will decline if x2 or x4 increase or if the parameter a declines, that is, if the age of
onset of mortality increases, people live longer or the period of chronic illness prior to
death declines. Line 5 gives the age-specific prevalence of chronic illness (the number
of chronically ill of a given age divided by the living population of that age).  This can
be seen to increase with age until it reaches a maximum of one at age x3.
Since mortality occurs at a constant rate and the period of chronic illness prior to
death is invariant, the average age of the chronically ill population (line 6) is given
simply by the mid-point between the age at onset of chronic illness and the age at which
the last member of the population dies.  Given the assumption that everyone survives to
x2 and that BC is a straight line, everyone under age x2 will, on average, live to an age
corresponding to the mid-point of line segment ZC (line 7), while everyone greater than
age x2   will, on average, live to (x4  - x) / 2.  The prevalence of chronic illness above age
x may be derived from lines 4 and 7; this corresponds also to the proportion of the
individual’s remaining years of life that he or she may expect to spend in a state of
disability and is shown in line 8. We shall use the result in line 9 shortly to test whether
Japanese mortality is becoming compacted or dispersed. It shows the relationship
between the proportion of the population deceased at age x and life expectancy at age x2,
the onset of mortality and uses the result in line 7.
How do some of these parameters translate into real-world numbers for Japan?
Assume the onset of mortality occurs at 65, that there is a 2-year period of chronic
illness prior to death and that the maximum age to which anyone survives is 105 years
(implying life expectancy at 65 of 20 years).  If the population is 119 million and every
year 1.4 million persons reach their 65th birthday, then we would expect 2.8 million
chronically ill people (2.4% of the population), with an average age of 84 years.  Life
expectancy at 65 would be 20 years and the prevalence of chronic illness above 65
would be 10%.  If 10% of the chronically ill were cared for in an institutional setting in
their last year of life, this would indicate a need for 280,000 nursing home beds, as
opposed to the roughly 200,000 that are currently available.
As line 4 of Table 1 reminds us, the proportion of the population that is
chronically ill will depend on the length of the period of chronic illness prior to death,
the age at the onset of mortality, and the maximum survival age.  So long as the first of
these (a) does not increase, policy makers have nothing to fear from improved survival
rates, whether these improvements take place at young ages (increasing the proportion
of persons reaching age x2) or at older ages (increasing age x4).  If the duration of
chronic illness prior to death is fixed and longevity is increasing, one would expect
prevalence rates to fall at the level of the population (lines 4 and 5) and the proportion
of remaining life years to be spent in a state of chronic illness to decline at the level of
the individual (line 8).  It is the possibility that increases in life expectancy will consist
of chronically ill life years that has both policy makers and individuals worried (Liu et
al., 1990; Bebbington, 1991; Manton and Stallard, 1994, 1996; Freedman and Martin,
1998).
5Life expectancy trends and “rectangularization” of the survival
curve
While we are in no position to contribute to the debate over whether added life
years are healthy ones, we can perform some extrapolations of life expectancy in Japan.
Consider the simplified model described above.  Figure 2 shows the theoretical
relationship predicted by the model between life expectancy at age 50 (vertical axis) and
the percentage of people dead at a given age (horizontal axis). Thus, if life expectancy
at 50 were 25 years, we would expect to observe half of the population which survived
to 50 dying by age 75 (point P), 40% dead by 70, 30% dead by 65, etc.  Note that the
complement of the cumulative mortality curve is a survival curve; thus, for example, if
40% of the population dies by a given age, 60% survives to at least that age.  In Figure
2, we illustrate the range 35e10 50 ≤≤ .  Based on x2  = 50 in line 7 of Table 1, this range
of variation corresponds to 12070 4 ≤≤ x .   It can be verified from line 9 of Table 1 that
the lines in Figure 2 are straight and have slope given 1 / 2σ, where σ is the proportion
who are dead.  Thus, for example, for σ=0.5 (the fiftieth percentile line) the gradient is
one; for σ=0.4 (the fortieth percentile line), the gradient is 1 / 0.8, etc.
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Figure 2: Life expectancy and cumulative mortality
As life expectancy (at 50) increases, the percentile curves fan out.  When e50 =
10 the difference between the 10% and 50% curves is 8 years (from about 52 to 60);
when e50 = 25 the difference is 20 years (from 55 to 75): when e50 = 35 the difference is
“off the chart” but equals 28 years (from 57 to 85).   This is consistent with the
6“dispersion of mortality” hypothesis, because as life expectancy increases, the range
over which deaths occur widens.
In order to analyze trends in Japanese mortality, we have used the life tables
published by Nanjo and Kobayashi (1985). These cover an extended period from 1891
to 1982 at annual intervals, for both males and females in one-year steps from 0 to 90
years old and therefore have the key advantage of providing a long run of data. The
authors present tables for survivors and for life expectancy on both a period and cohort
basis although since cohort-based tables are truncated and therefore incomplete we use
the period-based tables (B3 and B4, pages 42 to 55). Period-based tables provide a
snapshot of survival probabilities at a given period time and so may be, if anything, an
underestimate of survival probabilities for cohorts born in the same period.
Figure 3 plots female life expectancy at 50 against the ages of women
corresponding to cumulative mortality percentiles as in Figure 2 for the years 1960,
1970, 1975, 1980 and 1982.  Least-squares lines are fitted to the data points taken from
the life tables.  Parallel dotted horizontal lines indicate the period life tables from which
observations were drawn (so as not to clutter up the figure, we show the lines for only
1960 and 1982).  Thus, taking the 1960 life table as an example, on moving across the
chart from left to right we see that 20% of 50 year-old women would expect to die by
age 62 (point Q) and 30% by age 68 (point S).  According to the 1980 life table, 20% of
women surviving to age 50 would expect to die by age 73 (point P) and 30% by age 76
(point R).
Comparing Figure 3, whose cumulative mortality lines were estimated by least-
squares from life-table data, with Figure 2, whose lines were derived using the highly
simplified stationary population model, a significant difference emerges. Leaving aside
the extremes, i.e. the 10th and 90th percentiles, the data in Figure 3 appear more
consistent with the compression of mortality hypothesis than the dispersion of mortality
hypothesis.  In other words, if life expectancy at fifty continued to increase (the graph
was extended upwards), eventually we would see the lines converge, implying that
everyone would live to a certain age and then die – everyone, that is except the
extremely frail, corresponding to the 10th percentile, and the extremely robust,
corresponding to the 90th percentile.  The slope of the 90th percentile curve suggests
that as life expectancy at 50 increases, the longest-surviving members of the population
may survive to extremely advanced ages.
A word of caution is required before we use the results of the fitted model to
extrapolate survival curves. Life tables are themselves statistical representations of
survival processes that are based on data from various sources. The model ‘fit’ may
therefore contain implicit biases depending on the assumptions the producers of the life
tables used particularly to estimate survival probabilities in older age groups (for
example, the use of an arbitrary upper age limit to facilitate statistical curve fitting). A
further problem is that the life tables stop at 90 years, when relatively few people are
still alive and so it is not easy to corroborate estimates above these ages.
7Figure 3: Japanese female life expectancy at 50 plotted against the percentile of
women dead at a given age for the years 1960, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1982.
Data points were extracted from the female period-based life tables in Nanjo
and Kobayashi (1985) pages 42 to 55.
Figure 4 shows the development of Japanese life expectancy at 50 years of age
from 1891 onwards. Note the clear acceleration in the rate of increase – about 1 year of
added life expectancy at 50 every 4 years since 1960 as compared with 1 year every 18
years up to 1950 – corresponding to Japan’s rapid post-war development.   If the post-
war trend in Figure 4 continues, in 1998 life expectancy at 50 would have been 35
years, in 2006 it will be 37 years and in 2018 it will be 40 years. In fact, recent figures
available from the Ministry of Health and Welfare for 1998 give female life expectancy
at 50 to be 35.5 years so the projection appears to be right on track. These extrapolations
of life expectancy at 50, “plugged in” to the least-square lines estimated from the
historical life tables in Figure 3, give estimates of future cumulative mortality rates.
Thus, this is a “double extrapolation” exercise, the first extrapolation being life
expectancy at fifty and the second being extrapolation of the historical relation between
life expectancy at fifty and cumulative mortality (or survival) curves.
The results, expressed in terms of survival curves, are shown in Figure 5.
Counting from the left, the first two survival curves are the 1960 and 1982 complements
of the cumulative mortality curves in Figure 3.  The next three, corresponding to 1998,
2006, and 2018, result from the extrapolation exercise just described.  Consistent with
the compression of mortality phenomenon observed in Figure 3, there is a marked
“rectangularization” of the survival curve over time.  By 2018, according to Figure 5, a
woman who survives to 50 (almost all women, because death before 50 is already rather
rare) will have a 20% chance of still being alive at 97 years.  In 1960, by contrast, she
had a 20% chance of still being alive at 84.  The ‘spur’ of extremely aged Japanese
women that develops from 1982 onwards reflects the divergent 90% cumulative
8mortality curve in Figure 3.  Unfortunately the model cannot be reliably used for the
remaining 10% of survivors and so the survival curves are truncated at this point.
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Figure 5: Past and projected survival probabilities for Japanese women based on
trends in Figure 4 and least-squares lines fitted to points from historical life tables in
Figure 3.
9We have said that we are in no position to take a stand on whether years of life
expectancy added will be healthy ones or not.  Evidence from other countries, where the
aging process has not advanced as far as in Japan, is mixed: in the UK, for example,
healthy life expectancy is progressing at a slower rate than total life expectancy
(Bebbington, 1991; Dunnel and Dix, 2000). We used English Life Table No. 15 for
1990-92 and disability prevalence rates based on the highest severity categories (Martin
et al.,1988), to try to estimate the average duration of chronic severe disability prior to
death in the UK. Our results showed that persons dying prematurely experienced, on
average, 3 to 4 years of severe disability, those dying at very advanced ages averaged
less than one year, and those dying in the middle ranges averaged one to two years.
Whilst England is not necessarily representative of Japan, it is indicative of the intensity
and duration of medical care interventions in this stage of life in a fairly typical
industrial country.
Decomposing sources of change in Japanese health care
expenditure
Analysis shows that health care expenditure has been growing faster than GDP
in industrial countries, at least since 1960 when internationally comparable data started
to become available. In that period the health sector has increased its share of GDP from
just over 4% in 1960 to around 10% today (Mayhew, 2000).  Life expectancy trends
described in the previous section, plus the rising proportion of the population in elderly
age groups, might be expected to put yet further upward pressure on health care costs,
particularly in Japan.  Yet once age structure trends are put into perspective, it becomes
clear that there is nothing inevitable about rising health care costs.
In order to make this point, we use the projection methodology described in
Mayhew (2000). This is based on a simple ‘growth factor’ method, in which the growth
in health expenditure is assumed to be decomposable into a set of independent ‘growth
rates’ which can be estimated from available data. Theoretically, these rates could
represent the result of population aging and medical technology, the morbidity or case
mix of patients, treatment costs, or sectoral changes in the health care system itself such
as the growth of preventative medicine and so forth. The only criterion is they should
consist of separable, non-overlapping growth processes. We express the general form of
the model as follows:
∑
=
i
irt
eHtH  )0()(
where H(0) is health expenditure in a base period, H(t) is expenditure in time t  and ri is
the growth rate of a particular ‘growth factor’ such as treatment costs. In this section we
restrict ourselves to the effects of demographic change, a composite of aggregate
population growth and age structure change, and the so-called “underlying” growth rate,
estimated as residual.  The underlying growth rate captures a myriad of effects, such as
technological change (availability of new treatments and procedures, improvements in
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existing ones), changes in the price of medical care relative to the GDP deflator,
changes in take-up rates, etc. The specific form of the model in this case is:
)(
 )0()( pU rrteHtH +=
where rU is the underlying growth rate and rp reflects demographic change. The
parameter rp is derived by weighting each population age group by the relative per
capita cost of providing its members with health care (i.e., relative to some numeraire
age group such as the population aged 5-9), summing over age groups and indexing to a
base period. Mayhew (2000) describes the mathematical procedure in detail and how
the index may be decomposed into a ‘volume’ effect due to population increase (or
decline) and an age structure effect due to shift in the age structure of the population.
We based our age-specific cost weighting for Japan on the total cost of medical care per
insured person in 1994 (see Cichon et al., 1999, table JPN7, p. 324). The table shows
health care costs to be relatively level between ages 4 to 44 but then to increase over
six-fold in the over-70 age group, a finding that is consistent with available data from
other industrial countries (such as the UK). We assume that the age-specific relative
costs are invariant through time, which is not unreasonable based on the evidence,
although for reasons given later this assumption could break down in the case of
medical care for the chronically ill.  Our age-specific population projections are based
on UN figures.  Once rp has been calculated, the underlying growth rate ru is calculated
as a residual from the (known) overall growth rate, which can be calculated from
historical data.
In Table 2, the time frame is from 1960 to 2050 and is divided in five periods.
The Japanese economy grew rapidly between 1960 and 1970 at over 10% per annum
before slowing to 4.4% between 1970 and 1980 and 4.6% per annum between 1980 and
1985. Growth in health care expenditure matched economic growth in 1960-70, then
continued at 10% per annum as the economy slowed down, outstripping GDP growth
by a considerable margin. The period starting just prior to 1960 coincided with at least
two crucial policy changes. The first was the 1958 amendment to the 1938 National
Health Insurance Law covering rural workers, which extended health insurance to those
not already covered under occupational insurance, especially groups such as the old and
self-employed. The second was an amendment to the Old-age Welfare Law of 1963
providing free medical cover to the over 70s.
The rate of growth in health care expenditure then slowed between 1980 and
1995 to around 5.6% per annum. Two important policy changes in this period were
aimed at cost containment and switching some of the responsibility for elderly care back
to families. The first was the introduction (under the 1982 Health and Medical Services
for the Aged reforms) of co-payments for elderly patients; the second was the Gold Plan
of 1989, which led to the expansion of nursing beds and home help services.
The lesson of both periods -- rapid growth until 1980 and slower growth
thereafter -- is that medical expenditure growth reflects the policy environment.
Applying the decomposition method just described, it becomes apparent that for each of
the three sub-periods analysed, the contribution of the underlying rate of growth
11
exceeded that of demographic factors; in fact, it is only in 1980-95 that demographic
factor may be said to have made a very substantial contribution.
1960-70 1970-80 1980-95 1995-2020 2020-2050
GDP: % increase pa 9.9 4.4 4.6 2 2
Health spend: %
increase pa 10 10 5.6 4.08 2.79
of which due to
a. underlying rate 8.14 7.87 3.72 3 3
b. population change 1.03 1.13 0.48 -0.05 -0.55
c. aging 0.18 1 1.4 1.13 0.34
Health spend as share 4.55 6.5 7.18 9.42 11.48
of GDP at end of (12.09)* (18.91)*
Period
* If GDP growth is only 1% pa
instead of  assumed 2% pa
Table 2. The development of Japanese health care expenditure and GDP, 1960-2050.
The trend established between 1980 and 1995 is even more sharply
distinguishable when we look at the projected situation to 2020 and between 2020 and
2050. We assume economic growth at 2% (comparable but slightly less than that in
other industrial countries) per annum and an underlying health expenditure growth rate
of 3% per annum. In Mayhew (2000), which looked at developed countries as a whole,
we assumed the same growth rate for health expenditure, but our assumption for GDP
growth was higher at 3% per annum.
The contribution of aggregate population growth to Japanese health expenditure
has declined and will shortly turn negative as the population begins to decline.  Aging,
however, remains a significant cost driver between 1995 and 2020.  What is striking in
Table 2, however (and does not depend on the assumptions made regarding the
underlying growth rate and the rate of economic growth) is that the peak of age-
structure effects on health care spending growth is already past.  It corresponded to the
period 1980-95. In fact, from 2020-50, the total contribution of demographic trends
(aggregate population decline and aging taken together), will be to reduce, not increase,
the rate of growth of Japanese health care spending compared with the previous period.
Plainly, this is a striking result and to check its robustness we performed further
12
sensitivity tests by varying relative health costs for the 70+ age group and increasing the
number of elderly. We found that to put the demographic effects on a par with the
period 1980-1995 there would need to be significant changes in our base assumptions.
For example, we would have to increase relative health costs from 6 to 10 for this group
and the number of 70+ by 5m (+20%).
By the 2020, under our assumptions, health care expenditure will have grown to
around 9.4 % of GDP and by end 2050 to 11.5 %. This is still some way below the
levels currently experienced in the US (14%). Should underlying growth be 3% per
annum but the economy grow only 1% per annum, then the projected shares increase to
12.1 % and 18.9%.  There are a number of issues, of course, that could blow this
prospect off course - either up or down. One, as we have seen, is the assumption that
average per-capita health expenditure for different age groups will remain more or less
the same in relative terms.  For the older ages, this will depend crucially on the mix of
institutional versus home-based medical care.  We turn to the availability of home
medical care in the next section.  Another issue is the possibility of age-biased medical
technical change (development of more new treatments for the aged than for the young,
for instance) or a policy environment that either favoured or discouraged medical
consumption of the elderly relative to the young.
The supply of family caregivers
It was long a Japanese tradition for families to live in three-generation
households under one roof, thus reducing the demand or need for institutional care.  The
trend today, however, is away from such arrangements, for three reasons. One is that
older couples have independent financial means and are remaining healthier longer.
Another is that more Japanese women are in the labor force and have less time for care
giving.  A third reason is the rise in the elderly dependency ratio, i.e. the fact that there
are simply too many old people to be taken care of at home. It is convenient to divide
these trends into three periods between 1950 and 2020, and for these purposes we are
helped by the analysis of Horlacher (2000).
Between 1950 and 1970, the Japanese population grew from 83-104 million.
The median age in 1950 was 19 years or, to put the youthfulness of the population
another way, there were only 22 older adults per 100 children (that is people 60+ to
children 0-14). In the second phase between 1970 and 1995 the population increased to
125 million, median population age rose to 38 as a result of declining fertility and
increased life expectancy, and the number of older adults per 100 children increased to
129.  In the third phase, not yet completed, running from 1995 to 2020, the median age
is projected to increase to 44 and the adult children ratio to 230, the total population
reducing slightly to around 123 million.
Plainly, changes on this scale switch the focus of care in domestic settings from
young to old. In order to consider the availability of home care for the infirm elderly, we
consider a woman born to a typical Japanese family at two points in time, 1950 and
1970. We arbitrarily assume the woman to be the eldest child in the family, although
this is simply a matter of presentation.  We used 1950 and 1970 period life tables based
on Nanjo and Kobayashi (1985) for each generation to calculate the probability of each
member of the family being alive when the woman attains a given age. Note that period
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life tables are based on a snapshot of survival probabilities at a point in time and
therefore may underestimate actual survival where life expectancy is changing rapidly
relative to cohort tables. Secondly we constructed a synthetic but typical family, using
data in Takahashi et al. (1999) on the mean ages of women at marriage, mean age of
their partners, the age at which they have their first, second child, etc.
The values of the parameters are shown in Table 3.  For example, for first-born
daughters born in 1950, the mother was typically 24 years older, the first sibling 3 years
younger and the first child 27.5 years younger.  Perhaps the most striking feature in
Table 3 is the roughly similar profile of the women born in 1950 and 1970, including
the ages at which they had their first child. One important difference, however, is the
reduction by one in the number of siblings and the number of children. We then ‘age’
the woman and potential caregivers, defined to include parents, marriage partner,
siblings and children (note that grandchildren are excluded), to ascertain the number of
persons on whom the woman could depend if she became ill or infirm.  We arbitrarily
defined care giving ‘eligibility’ to be ages between 21 and 80; for example, the
woman’s child does not become a potential caregiver until age 21.   Note that because
caregivers are predominantly women, and because not all children live in the same
community as their parents, etc., what we are presenting in Table 3 is a clear
overestimate of the effective supply of caregivers.
Relation 1950 1970
Mother 24 27.5
Father 26.9 30.2
1st sibling (3) (2.5)
2nd sibling (6) (5.5)
3rd sibling (9)
1st child (27.5) (27.5)
2nd child (30)
Partner 2.9 2.7
Age at
marriage
23 24.2
Table 3: Differences in ages of close relations for a woman born the eldest in a family
in 1950 and 1970 (based on Takahashi et al., 1999). Bracketed figures indicate negative
age differences.
The results are plotted in Figure 6, where the horizontal axis gives the woman’s
age and the vertical axis gives the expected number of potential caregivers.  The upward
peak in the early twenties (A) corresponds to marriage, the upward peak in the late
forties (B) corresponds to children reaching 21.  The availability of care peaks at age 50,
after which it gradually declines as parents and siblings die.  Finally, at Point C, there
are no own-generation caregivers left (all siblings and the husband are either dead or
over 80), only children.  Comparing the two plots, it is evident that from about age 30
onwards, the pool of available caregivers is always greater for the woman born in 1950
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than the woman born in 1970, the difference being approximately one.  At age 80, when
a substantial number of women are likely to need some care, the availability of potential
caregivers for the woman born in 1970 is estimated to be about one, as opposed to about
two for the woman born in 1950.  If we figured in changing living arrangements
(growing mobility of children) and rising female labor force participation in addition to
changing marriage, fertility, and mortality patterns, the decline in potential caregivers
would be even more pronounced.  While we cannot be precise, it appears certain that
between the time that women born in 1950 and women born in 1970 turn 80, there will
be a decline of well over 50% in the availability of within-family care.
Figure 6: Graph showing the estimated number of caregivers available to a Japanese
woman born in 1950 and one born in 1970.
The Japanese health care system: A compromise between the
UK and US
How is Japan’s health care system organised and financed, and how does it
compare with elsewhere? Mackellar and Mayhew (2000) schematise health care
systems according to whether they are privately or publicly financed and whether care is
privately or publicly provided. Their framework is shown in Figure 7.  Japan, with its
compulsory universal social health insurance system, falls mainly into the top-right
quadrant. The population pays for health care through social insurance premiums and
taxes in different proportions, depending on which insurance scheme they belong to. In
spite of heavy government regulation including control over prices, over 80% of health
care providers operate independently within the private sector.
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Figure 7: Typology of health care systems showing typical finance mechanisms and
different private-public splits.
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In addition to reimbursement mechanisms and government subsidies there is a
co-payment system in operation for which patients are billed, although in the case of the
elderly this is very small (OECD, 1990). Because it costs far more to treat the elderly
than other age groups there is explicit cross-subsidization between the schemes using a
‘pooling’ arrangement.  This may be contrasted with, for example, the UK, which has a
nationalized health system (top left cell), and which is financed directly out of
government revenues and is entirely free at the point of use.  Here, cross-subsidization
is implicit rather than explicit, the system itself resembling a kind of ‘Pay As You Go’
pension system.  The US system is different again, being essentially privately funded
but with substantial free provision for the elderly under the Medicare program and for
the impoverished under the Medicaid program, but also with a large population without
any insurance at all.  Importantly, in Japan the frontiers of free or ‘almost’ free
provision extend further than in the US system and to some degree even further than in
the UK system in the case of elderly care services – although this is changing somewhat
due to cost pressures.
From an international perspective Japan’s health care system is generally well
regarded but with certain provisos.  It is relatively ‘cheap’ by international standards,
consuming only around 7.2% of GDP as compared with 14% in the US and 10% on
average in more developed countries. One reason for its relatively strong record on cost
containment is the use of fee lists or tariffs (actually a ‘points’ system) for reimbursing
providers. Unlike cost reimbursement practices in other countries, which bear a close
relation to costs, the fees charged in Japan do not necessarily represent the true costs of
medical interventions.  The system may be used by government to encourage or
discourage particular patterns of treatment.
How then does the Japanese health care system shape up overall? The World
Health Organization (WHO, 2000) recently published tables of health system attainment
in which each country is ranked according to the health of the population, the
responsiveness of the health care system, the fairness of financial contribution, and
overall expenditure on health care. Not surprisingly the Japanese come first in terms of
health attainment due to their leading position in terms of international longevity which
has been attributed to their generally healthy lifestyle. In terms of overall ranking WHO
puts Japan in 10th position as compared with the UK (18th) and the US (37th). The top
country according to WHO at present is France whereas the bottom country in the more
developed group is the Russian Federation (130th).
Despite Japan’s high ranking on WHO measures, for outsiders some aspects of
Japanese health care appear contrary and puzzling, especially if certain trends are
compared with other countries. One of the most surprising features is the average length
of hospital stay, around 35 days (twice as long for elderly patients), which has remained
high while falling elsewhere (to an average of only around 6 days in the UK and US).
The reasons have less to do with the quality of care or the methods of treatment, but
more with the practice of lumping together acute and chronically ill patients (in large
hospitals especially). This, together with financial incentives in the system, tends to
encourage the practice of keeping patients in hospital for long periods. Japanese health
statistics, for example, do not recognize the concept of  ‘acute’ care beds, as do the
statistical systems in other countries (OECD, 1998). Since 1989 Japanese statistics have,
however, recognized the category of nursing home beds. These are defined as ‘facilities
for the elderly which provide medical care as well as living services to bed-ridden
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people’ (OECD, 1998), whom they estimated to number over 600,000.  This is two-
thirds the annual number of deaths, which would, recalling the simple model introduced
at the beginning of this paper, be consistent with a period of eighteen months’
incapacity prior to death.
As noted already, the rapid growth of nursing beds is a particular feature of
recent years and is the result of the ‘Gold Plan’. The aim of this plan is to separate out
care for the chronically ill from care for acute patients by creating new long-term care
capacity and elderly care services provided direct to homes (Endo and Katayama, 1998).
The pattern of growth in nursing home beds since 1989 is shown in Figure 8 and is
testimony to the rapid progress achieved over a short period, although long-term care
capacity remains low by some international standards.
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Figure 8: Growth of Japanese nursing beds since 1989.
In Table 4, a simple ratio analysis is used to calculate the nursing home supply
gap.  In ca. 2000, there were 900,000 deaths, 600,000 bedridden patients and 200,000
nursing home beds.  In 2020, according to UN population projections, there will be
1,800,000 deaths.  Assuming that the ratio of bedridden chronically ill to deaths remains
at 0.67, this would imply 1,200,000 bedridden chronically ill.  Even to keep the ratio of
nursing home beds to chronically ill bedridden patients constant at its current level of
0.33 will require the availability of 400,000 nursing home beds, twice the current
number.  Raising it to 0.5 in view of the scarcity of home care noted in the previous
section would require 600,000 nursing home beds.  Clearly the challenge facing
Japanese policy makers in the area of long term care is a considerable one.
Year 2000 2020
Deaths
bedridden and chronically ill
nursing home beds
Availability : need
900,000
600,000
200,000
0.33
800,000
1,200,000
600,000
0.5
Table 4: Nursing home bed availability and need
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Discussion (by Landis MacKellar)
It is now broadly recognized that growth in the number of elderly persons is
neither necessary nor sufficient for rising health care expenditure.  Say, for the sake of
simplicity, that medical spending is just the cost of dying; i.e., that health care
expenditure is equal to the number of deaths times the price tag on each death.  Then
health care spending would rise only if the number of persons dying in an average year
increased or if deaths were redistributed from age spans over which it is cheap to die to
age spans over which it is expensive to die.  Regarding the first, if two stationary
populations of identical size but with different life expectancies are compared, the
population with greater longevity will have a smaller number of deaths per year
(because fewer persons will be born each year as well; that is why the two populations
are of identical size). Not surprisingly, therefore, according to the stationary population
model in Section 1, the crucial variable from the standpoint of health costs is not
longevity, but the length of the period of chronic illness before death (the price tag, in
our parlance).  Regarding the second source of increased heath care spending, some
evidence shows that deaths occurring relatively early (in the sixties and seventies)
involve greater medical expenditure than deaths occurring relatively late (the eighties
and nineties). Seen from this perspective, increases in longevity are an unlikely source
of higher health care spending.
Among the more striking conclusions from this paper is that in terms of the
demographic contribution to rising health care costs, the worst is already over.  The
contribution of demographic aging peaked in 1980-1995.  The contribution of
population growth is now negative.
Not all costs associated with old age are medical.  Many older elderly are not
chronically ill but are nonetheless to a large degree dependent, requiring non-medical
care such as meals-on-wheels, assistance with simple daily tasks, etc.  Analysis of
longevity trends leaves little doubt that life expectancy in Japan will continue to
increase, meaning that survival into the nineties will become commonplace. One of the
most striking aspects of the Japanese health care system has been the underdevelopment
of both institutional and outreach care of the elderly.  Part of the reason has been
reliance on the three-generation household as a source of elder care; however, as this
paper makes clear, a demographic squeeze is developing in the supply of in-family
caregivers.  Increased mobility of children and increased attachment of women to the
labor force make the demographic squeeze even tighter.  Japanese policymakers have
recognized the need for expanded elder care facilities and outreach institutions and, with
the Gold Plan, have put in place a policy package that will address these needs.
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